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LEGISLATIVE REFORM
WIRETAPPING AND THE CONFINES OF THE
MARITAL HOME: What Part of "Any" Don't You
Understand?
I. INTRODUCTION
Family values and marital relationships have been the topic of sociological, polit-
ical, and legal debate in recent years. At the center of that debate is electronic surveil-
lance which has become a method of modem warfare in the marital home as ammuni-
tion for both divorce cases and custody battles. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520' regulates electronic surveillance
and has been a subject of great disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals.2
The split in the circuits is centered upon whether the interception of telephone
conversations of one spouse by the other without the knowledge or consent of the
spouse being wiretapped is included within the statutory prescription of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The Fifth Circuit, in Simpson v. Simpson3 held
that Title III did not reach the tapping by one spouse of the other spouse's phone
conversation. Thus, interspousal immunity to the civil cause of action created by §
2520 was recognized by the Fifth Circuit.' Although this holding has been followed
by the Second Circuit,6 it has been expressly rejected by the Fourth,7 Sixth,8 Eighth,9
and Tenth Circuits."
The effect of the split concerning the interspousal immunity exception creates
confusion as to the intent and meaning of the statute. This confusion results in the
obvious problem of spousal wiretapping being legal and unpunishable in one state
while in other jurisdictions it results in both civil liability and criminal punishment.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988) [hereinafter cited as Title III or by section].
2. Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d
677 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Simpson v. Simpson, 490
F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
3. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 provides:
(a) In general.-Except as provided in § 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or
electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of
this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in
that violation such relief as may be appropriate.
5. Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
6. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
7. Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
8. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
9. Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989).
10. Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1991).
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II. INTERSPOUSAL WIRETAPPING
A. Interspousal Immunity Exception: Simpson v. Simpson
In Simpson v. Simpson the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first federal
court to apply the wire interception provisions of Title III to interspousal wiretap-
ping." Mr. Simpson placed a tapping device on the phone within his marital resi-
dence to confirm his suspicions that his wife was unfaithful to him. 2 Mr. Simpson
taped conversations between his wife and another man. 3 He further proceeded to play
the tapes to various individuals including a lawyer. 4 The tapes resulted in an uncon-
tested divorce from his wife.15 Mrs. Simpson brought a civil suit against her husband
to recover damages pursuant to Title 11.6
The language which allows civil suits, and upon which Mrs. Simpson relied,
reads:
any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed,
or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from
the person or entity which engaged in that violation. 7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the wire interception provisions of
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 did not apply to the interception
by a spouse of a partner's conversations in "the marital home."'8 The Fifth Circuit
based its argument on several contentions. Although the court conceded that the plain
language of the Act included interspousal wiretapping, it argued that the Congress did
not intend for the act to have such far-reaching results. 9 The court continued by as-
serting that domestic conflicts within the home are usually handled by states, and that
Congress did not intend to encroach upon the territory of traditional state matters. 20
The Fifth Circuit continued by conducting an "exhaustive" search to determine
the legislative intent behind Title I1.2' The court decided that Congress did not intend
to regulate interspousal wiretapping through Title I1I.' The court found that the major
purpose of Title III is to combat organized crime. 23 The court determined that al-
though Congress alluded to the dilemma of interspousal wiretapping its inclusion in the
statute was somewhat incidental.24 The court lent support to this contention by expos-
ing the lack of testimony devoted to interspousal wiretapping in comparison to the
testimony offered on crime control. 5 In addition, the court explained that the majority
of testimony on interspousal wiretapping dealt with an intrusion into the marital home
11. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
12. Id. at 804.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
•17. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 805.
19. Id. at 805.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 806.
22. Id. at 805.
23. Id. at 807.
24. Id. at 807.
25. Id.
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by a third party such as a private investigator.26 The court distinguished wiretapping
by an "outside third party" with the consent of one spouse from the facts in
Simpson." The court surmised that this type of third party intrusion is included within
the language and intent of the statute:
[T]o our minds, a third-party intrusion into the marital home, even if instigated by
one spouse, is an offense against a spouse's privacy of a much greater magnitude
than is personal surveillance by the other spouse. The latter, it seems to us, is con-
sistent with whatever expectations of privacy spouses might have vis-a-vis each
other within the marital home.'
The court conceded, however, that the legislative history of Congress suggested a
general awareness of the problem of interspousal wiretapping within the home.29
However, the court pointed out that Title III contains an exception which does not
prohibit a person from intercepting a family member's telephone conversation by using
an extension.3" The court elected to analogize Simpson with this exception and there-
by concluded that Congress did not intend to intrude upon the confines of the marital
home.3
The Second Circuit in Anonymous v. Anonymous32 took the same view the Fifth
Circuit laid out in Simpson v. Simpson.33
B. Interspousal Wiretapping: Included within Title III
In United States of America v. Jones, the Sixth Circuit clearly attacked the ratio-
nale of Simpson.' In Jones, Mr. Jones, who was separated from his wife, intercepted
his wife's telephone calls after he suspected that she was involved in extramarital af-
fairs.33 Mr. Jones utilized the taped telephone conversations in obtaining the di-
vorce.36 Criminal charges were then filed against Mr. Jones pursuant to Title III. 3"
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found the language of Title III to be
straightforward and comprehensive.38 The court's own review of Title III's legislative
history led them to the conclusion that Title III "establishes a broad prohibition on all
private electronic surveillance and that a principal area of congressional concern was
electronic surveillance for the purposes of marital litigation."39 The court continued by
explaining that any exceptions to Title III, including an interspousal immunity, would
have been included in the statute. The court cited statements made by Senator Long,
the Chairman of the subcommittee, who identified three major areas where private
electronic surveillance was widespread: "The three large areas of snooping in this
(non-governmental) field are (1) industrial, (2) divorce cases, and (3) politics. So far,
26. Id. at 808.
27. Id. at 809.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
33. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
34. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
35. Id. at 663.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 668.
39. Id. at 669.
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we have heard no real justification for continuance of snooping in these three ar-
eas."
4
The court also opined on the distinction drawn in Simpson4 ' between third-party
interceptions and spousal interceptions. The court determined that no such distinction
exists:
In our view, it is a classic 'distinction without a difference.' For purposes of feder-
al wiretap law, it makes no difference whether a wiretap is placed on a telephone
by a spouse or by a private detective in the spouse's employ. The end result is the
same, the privacy of the unconsenting parties to the intercepted conversation has
been invaded.2
Therefore, the court determined that the harm suffered by both intrusions were equiva-
lent and no distinction can be made in regards to the end result - a gross invasion of
privacy.
The court rejected the notion that the doctrine of interspousal immunity prevent-
ed the application of Title III to cases involving interspousal wiretapping.43 First, the
court demonstrated that the doctrine of interspousal immunity is a state law that is not
entirely uniform." The current trend is that the doctrine is outdated and many states
have abrogated it.45 Second, because Title III is a federal law it is a serious question
as to whether a doctrine of state tort law should even influence a federal statute.'
Third, the doctrine of interspousal immunity does not apply to criminal prosecutions.47
The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that interspousal wiretapping is
actionable under Title 111.48
III. TITLE III REVISIONS
Marital dissolution has become an unfortunate trend in our society in recent
years. As a result, electronic surveillance has frequently been employed to aid in di-
vorce and custody cases.
Title III was clearly meant to include interspousal wiretapping. The provisions
are unambiguous and comprehensive. Professor G. Robert Blakey of the Notre Dame
Law School, one of the drafters of Title III, asserts that Title III was intended to in-
clude interspousal wiretapping.49 When asked to comment on the current circuit split,
Professor Blakey remarked, "It is hard for me to understand how judges fail to see that
'any person' means 'any person."'' ° Although a reading of the statute inclines one to
agree with the view espoused by Professor Blakey, an unfortunate split remains in the
circuits as to whether interspousal immunity applies to Title III. Therefore, in the con-
40. Id.
41. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
42. 542 F.2d 661, 670 (6th Cir. 1976).
43. Id. at 671.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 944 F.2d 1537, 1540 (10th Cir. 1991); 868 F.2d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 1989); 732 F.2d 372, 374
(4th Cir. 1984).
49. Interview with G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School,
Notre Dame, Indiana (March I, 1994).
50. Id.
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text of facilitating application of the statute consistent with legislative intent, Congress
should amend the definition of "person" and "aggrieved person" in § 2510 of Title III.
The definitions of "person" and "aggrieved person" should be amended as follows:
(6) "person" means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or
subdivision thereof, and any individual not limited by relationship of marriage,
partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation."
(11) "aggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or
oral communication not limited by relationship of marriage, or a person not limited
by relationship of marriage against whom the interception was directed. 2
The redraft would clarify the split because courts would not be inclined to em-
ploy the flawed interpretation of Title III used in Simpson. Courts would interpret
cases involving interspousal wiretapping in a manner which is consistent with the plain
meaning of the statute, the legislative intent of Congress, and decisions such as Jones.
Savalle Davis*
51. § 2510(6) currently reads:
(6) "person" means any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political
subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company,
trust, or corporation.
52. § 2510(11) currently reads:
(11) "aggrieved person" means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral,
or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.
* B.S., Syracuse University, 1992; J.D., Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1995.
1994]

